Interesting corrective responses to my post earlier this week on different types of proportionality and Israel's 2014 Operation Protective Edge in Gaza.
Latest in International Law: LOAC: Proportionality
Yesterday found me in Israel listening—not for the first time—to a briefing on Israel Defense Forces (IDF) targeting practices during Operation Protective Edge, the 2014 military operation against Hamas in Gaza. I can’t go into the details on the briefing, as it was not on the record, but for those interested in a detailed account of the subject, Section VI of this report from the Israeli Foreign Ministry covers some of the same ground.
I'm very happy to report that the 3rd annual Transatlantic Workshop on International Law and Armed Conflict will occur at Oxford next week. As I explained last summer, this event is co-sponsored by the ICRC's DC and London delegations, the Oxford Institute for Ethics, Law, and Armed Conflict, the Oxford Martin Programme on Human Rights for Future Generations, South Texas College of Law (through the good offices of my friend Geoff Corn), and the Strauss Center at UT (which I direct).
The UN Human Rights Council’s Independent Commission of Inquiry report on the 2014 Gaza war, released Monday, is a bad piece of work—bad in almost entirely predictable and boring ways, but no less bad for being bad and predictable. It is also no less important for being boring.
Here it is. Here's the press release that accompanies it:
GENEVA (22 June 2015): The United Nations Independent Commission of Inquiry on the 2014 Gaza conflict has gathered substantial information pointing to the possible commission of war crimes by both Israel and Palestinian armed groups.
When scholars analyze Israeli military actions against Palestinian militant groups, the discussion inevitably turns to the principle of proportionality. Advocates and analysts sift through lists of the names of the dead, review drone footage from before missile strikes, and endlessly debate whether anticipated military advantage justified foreseeable civilian costs.
The use of lethal force (whether via armed drone, manned aircraft, cruise missile, helicopter assault, etc.) has been a cornerstone of U.S. counterterrorism policy for many years, both in places where we have ground combat deployments and places where we do not. Throughout this period, the legality, efficacy, wisdom, and morality of this practice has been the subject of intense scrutiny and debate. Nonetheless, the kinetic option has proven remarkably durable over time (especially as compared to its sibling, the use of non-criminal detention).
Judicial imperialism is defeating the British armed forces. At least this is what the authors of a report recently published by the Policy Exchange---an influential British think tank---claim.
Naz Modirzadeh’s fascinating series of Lawfare posts (here, here, and here) discussing her article, Folk International Law, provides an excellent primer on the potential consequences and confusion that result from amalgamating distinct legal doctrines, regardless of whether such creative tinkering is couched under the rubric of “
The next installment in the series of posts derived from this summer's Transatlantic Dialogue on International Law and Armed Conflict is now live at the ICRC's Intercross blog. It is from Ken Watkin, and it concerns the overlap of IHL and IHRL. A taste: