Among the documents that Edward Snowden released are reports showing that the NSA had been picking up email and phone conversations by and among foreign leaders. Among the alleged targets were officials from the EU, individual EU member countries, Brazil, and Mexico. While each subject of this reported surveillance has expressed outrage, perhaps no state has been more agitated than Germany. Revelations about NSA activity directed at the EU have posed significant problems for the German government, given East Germany’s history of widespread surveillance of its own citizens by the Stasi.
Latest in International Law: LOAC: Field of Application
"Does it really matter, from a legal perspective, whether the U.S.
Bobby’s post from Friday argued that “the current shadow war approach to counterterrorism doesn’t really require an armed-conflict predicate–or an AUMF, for that matter.” Bobby’s point is that most if not all of the USG’s current uses of force outside Afghanistan could in theory continue even if the armed conflict against al Qaeda ended. This is because, as Bobby says, the administration’s “imminent threat” constraint outside hot battlefields – which has allowed quite a lot of lethal force to be used in many nations – “is at le
This post draws on material from my current book project, the concluding chapter of which considers the legal architecture of counterterrorism in a "postwar" setting...and advances the argument that we already have largely crossed into that world.
In yesterday's speech, President Obama repeatedly referred to the possibility that the armed conflict with al Qaeda may end, and indeed that it must and should end lest we find ourselves in a perpetual state of war. It is the same perspective prev
From Harold Koh’s speech to the Oxford Union the other day: the first "obvious" difference between the Bush and Obama administrations is that "the Obama Administration has not treated the post-9/11 conflict as a Global War on Terror to which no law applies, in which the United States is authorized to use force anywhere, against anyone.
We appreciate Jack’s quick and comprehensive clarification of his views—and of what the CGWW proposal we critiqued last night seeks to achieve. Like Jack, we want to start by emphasizing the many areas of agreement between us and CGWW in order to help illuminate the key points of disagreement.
The following is a guest post from Ryan Goodman, continuing a conversation begun yesterday in this post from Geoff Corn, Laurie Blank, Chris Jenks, and Eric Jensen.
What the Critics of the “Lesser Evil” Rule (Still) Get Wrong: A Rejoinder to Corn, Blank, Jenks, and Jensen
by Ryan Goodman
I recently wrote that the law of armed conflict places constraints on the decision to kill or capture enemy fighters.
Several years ago, in a prescient op-ed in the Washington Post, our colleague John Bellinger argued that the September 2001 AUMF was an increasingly poor fit for the evolving threats facing the United States. It is a theme to which many of us have returned in the intervening years, as unfolding trends and events have exacerbated this concern.
Against that backdrop, we are pleased to announce the publication (through the Hoover Insti
What is the United States actually doing so far, and what else reportedly is on the table?
1. So far we have agreed to provide airlift support to the French, on their dime. That is, France is going to pay the United States some $20 million in exchange for the services of C-17s (and possibly also C-5s) that will bear French troops and equipment (armored vehicles, for example) into Mali.