Latest in Going Dark
The court held, for the second time in five years, that the government may compel a defendant to unlock an electronic device under certain circumstances.
GCHQ’s proposal to allow governments to eavesdrop on encrypted communications with a warrant is a backdoor by another name.
The Levy-Robinson proposal is no less dangerous a backdoor than any others that have been proposed.
A response to Ian Levy and Crispin Robinson’s principles for debate on exceptional access and proposal for conducting such access.
The security community should its time and talents making the digital world safer rather than demolishing what trust and security still remain in our technology, our devices, and our infrastructure.
Even if it could be built, “responsible” law enforcement access technology is not responsible at all.
GCHQ officials outline how to enable the majority of the necessary lawful access without undermining the values we all hold dear.
Over the next few days, a series of essays on Lawfare will capture some of the views presented at the Crypto 2018 Workshop on Encryption and Surveillance.
The statement is an effort by the intelligence alliance to show support for a new Australian proposal on lawful access to encrypted devices. But it ignores technical realities—and certain important signatures are missing.
Ray Ozzie’s proposal for exceptional access has the virtue of being simple. But security can be subtle, and simple solutions often miss critical aspects. This one has.