The Levy-Robinson proposal is no less dangerous a backdoor than any others that have been proposed.
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A response to Ian Levy and Crispin Robinson’s principles for debate on exceptional access and proposal for conducting such access.
Rather than continuing to politicize encryption, instead the lessons learned from the decades-long crypto policy debate should be used to inform the process of developing Exceptional Access technology.Rather than continuing to politicize encryption, instead the lessons learned from the decades-long crypto policy debate should be used to inform the process of developing Exceptional Access technology.
The security community should its time and talents making the digital world safer rather than demolishing what trust and security still remain in our technology, our devices, and our infrastructure.
Even if it could be built, “responsible” law enforcement access technology is not responsible at all.
GCHQ officials outline how to enable the majority of the necessary lawful access without undermining the values we all hold dear.
Over the next few days, a series of essays on Lawfare will capture some of the views presented at the Crypto 2018 Workshop on Encryption and Surveillance.
Chinese and Russian eavesdropping on President Trump’s calls on his personal smartphone points out the need for securing communications.
How should a court rule when the subject of an order to compel decryption of a device pleads the Fifth Amendment?
The statement is an effort by the intelligence alliance to show support for a new Australian proposal on lawful access to encrypted devices. But it ignores technical realities—and certain important signatures are missing.