Today’s White House statement about last night’s spectacular Special Operations raid into Syria states that “This operation was conducted with the full consent of Iraqi authorities and, like our existing airstrikes against ISIL in Syria, consistent with domestic and international law.” However, the raid raises complicated questions about the domestic and international law basis both for the incursion into Syria, and for the detention of Abu Sayyaf’s wife
Latest in Detention: Operations in Iraq
Interested in the ongoing debate over the relationship between LOAC and Human Rights Law in general, or the intersection of those bodies of law in relation to non-criminal detention in particular? You won't want to miss this.
In 2012, the UN Human Rights Council asked the UN Working Group on Arbitrary Detention to produce a document spelling out just what it means to say there is a prohibition on arbitrary detention--including in the context of armed conflict.
Polarization surrounding the SSCI Report (see here for Lawfare’s coverage) has been most pronounced on the efficacy of enhanced interrogation techniques (EITs). The Report and its supporters have proclaimed that EITs never produce useful information. Unfortunately, that pat assertion undermines the possibility of a consensus on future interrogation tactics, including a consensus that rules out coercion.
Findings, Conclusions and Areas of Dispute Between the SSCI Report, the Minority and the CIA: Part 2
Below, you will find the second installment in our ongoing effort to identify, in summary form, key areas of dispute as between the SSCI, the SSCI minority, and the CIA with regard the CIA's detention and interrogation program.
Belatedly, I want to join the discussion about the extraterritorial application of the Convention Against Torture (CAT), about which Jack commented on Friday, drawing on an article by Charlie Savage earlier in the week.
Over at Newsweek, Jeff Stein wonders: "What Will U.S. Forces Do With ISIS Prisoners?"
Among the many unresolved issues in the campaign to “degrade and destroy” ISIS, as it’s generally known, is what to do with prisoners in Iraq or Syria, should American special operators or U.S.-backed forces be lucky enough to capture any. How deeply will we be involved in interrogating them?
The Washington Post had an important story yesterday involving the future of the 53 military detainees who remain in U.S.
I've posted many times on the gradual but inexorable process through which the United States is closing out its detention operations in Afghanistan, including this recent update. It has been a bumpy road, and after President Karzai recently suggested that he would quickly release certain detainees once able to do so, it not surprisingly has gotten bumpier. The New York Times explains:
In September, when
The meeting between Presidents Obama and Karzai today appears to have produced an agreement that will revive the process of shutting down U.S. detention operations in Afghanistan. As reported in the Wall Street Journal:
With Mr. Obama at his side, Mr. Karzai said on Friday that the two have agreed on what he called the complete return of detention centers and detainees to "Afghan sovereignty," but offered few details.
A few years ago I wrote a paper about the cycle of detention law and policy over time in Iraq, and among other conclusions I observed that the sustainability of overseas, US-administered detention facilities established in the context of a large-footprint combat deployment is inextricably linked to the sustainability of the underlying deployment itself--and that sooner or later the same cycle would unfold in Afghanistan as previously unfolded in Iraq (up to and including Daqduq-type questions about the fate of persons whom we would wish to hold even after a withdrawal of forces). That cycle