On Monday, Khalid Ahmed Qassim filed a motion for en banc review of Judge Thomas Hogan’s May 10 denial of a petition for habeas relief.
Latest in Detention
The dissent in the D.C. Circuit’s ruling in Doe suffers from a self-defeating logical error.
On Tuesday, Judge Thomas Hogan of the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia denied Khalid Ahmed Qassim’s petition for a writ of habeas corpus. Russell Spivak summarized the joint status report, motion in limine, and a prehearing brief filed in the case for Lawfare in March. Read Hogan’s one-page judgment below:
Revisiting the Prosecution Option in Doe v. Mattis: Is the Real Aim Here to Secure a Citizenship Waiver?
Prosecuting John Doe seemed unviable at first. Things may be different now.
What to make of the court's split decision.
The U.S. Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit has released its opinion affirming the lower court's injunction on the U.S. military's planned transfer of John Doe, a U.S. citizen held in military custody in Iraq. The court ruled on Monday, but the opinion was previously under seal.
On Monday, we learned that a divided panel of the D.C. Circuit has sided with the ACLU on the question whether the U.S. government can involuntarily transfer a dual U.S.-Saudi citizen whom U.S. forces have held as an enemy combatant in Iraq since last September.
The U.S. Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit affirmed Judge Tanya Chutkan's April 19 preliminary enjoining the transfer of John Doe in Doe v. Mattis. Judge Sri Srinivisan’s opinion for the court and Judge Karen Henderson’s dissent remain under seal pending a security review.
Three weeks after the U.S. Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit heard oral arguments over a preliminary injunction in Doe v. Mattis, the same panel returned to hear a second round of arguments over another preliminary injunction in the same case. And no, we still haven’t reached the merits.
When the D.C. Circuit hears oral argument in Doe v. Mattis this Friday morning, the central question before it is whether John Doe’s unusual circumstances fall within the scope of the Supreme Court’s 1936 Valentine decision or, instead, its 2008 Munaf decision.