Latest in Biodefense
Around the world, spies are being used to respond to the pandemic by collecting information and equipment, engaging in information warfare, and exploiting contact-tracing platforms.
COVID-19 apps in the United States have been ineffective as public health tools because they are designed primarily to protect privacy. Poor design choices, effectively mandated by Google and Apple, were driven by ongoing consumer privacy and national security debates that shortsightedly rejected tracking technologies.
Inherent technical limitations mean that contact-tracing apps, at best, play a relatively small public health role and, at worst, risk doing more harm than good.
Lessons learned from the privacy considerations of North Carolina’s coronavirus response.
With the White House in the midst of a coronavirus outbreak, it’s not safe.
What happens if a sick presidential candidate won't drop out? This hypothetical illuminates important features in the presidential electoral system.
History provides plenty of reason to believe that the public will not receive thorough updates about President Trump’s health following his diagnosis with COVID-19.
What insights does the 9/11 Commission Report have for the current era?
A 2016 Department of Defense report identified several deficiencies in biosafety and biosecurity policies and procedures in Defense Department laboratories. A recent follow-up report found that some problems persist.
House Republicans have sued to enjoin the use of the House’s proxy voting system. Will the case break new ground?