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Aegis

Understanding Police Reliance on Private Data

Farhang Heydari   Fri, Oct 8, 2021, 9:03 AM

Although law enforcement investigations have always depended on information from private actors, modern technology and big data have transformed an analog collection process into an automated, digital one. This shift has elevated the role that private entities play in the investigative process, mirroring the growth of private influence across the entire criminal system. Many of these private influences have been fiercely criticized.

Aegis

Private Data/Public Regulation

Barry Friedman   Mon, Oct 4, 2021, 9:20 AM

Policing increasingly relies on the collection of digital data, often of people for whom there is no basis for suspicion. Police seek fewer search warrants and more requests to harvest metadata, they buy data from brokers, they track location and other aspects of our lives. Sometimes police collect the data themselves. More often they gather it from third parties. They do so by purchase, and by court order.

Aegis

Modern Day General Warrants and the Challenge of Protecting Third-Party Privacy Rights in Mass, Suspicionless Searches of Consumer Databases

Jennifer Lynch   Tue, Sep 28, 2021, 8:51 AM

Today, more than ever, law enforcement has access to massive amounts of consumer data that allow police to, essentially, pluck a suspect out of thin air. Internet service providers and third parties collect and aggregate precise location data generated by our devices and their apps, making it possible for law enforcement to easily determine everyone who was in a given area during a given time period.

Aegis

'Defend Forward' and Sovereignty

Jack Goldsmith, Alex Loomis   Fri, Apr 30, 2021, 11:26 AM

Among the most discussed provisions of the Tallinn Manual 2.0 is Rule 4: “Violation of sovereignty.” Rule 4 provides: “A State must not conduct cyber operations that violate the sovereignty of another State.” Considered alone, Rule 4 is banal and unobjectionable, since there are many established sovereignty-based international-law rules that cyber operations might violate.

Aegis

Cyberattacks and the Constitution

Matthew Waxman   Thu, Nov 12, 2020, 8:01 AM

The United States has one of the world’s strongest and most sophisticated capabilities to launch cyberattacks against adversaries. How does the US Constitution allocate power to use that capability? And what does that allocation tell us about appropriate executive-legislative branch arrangements for setting and implementing cyber strategy?

Aegis

Due Diligence and the U.S. Defend Forward Cyber Strategy

Eric Talbot Jensen, Sean Watts   Tue, Oct 20, 2020, 11:06 AM

As its name implies, the 2018 US Department of Defense Defend Forward strategy is principally reactive. The strategy assumes that the United States will continue to suffer harm from competitors and malign actors through cyberspace. Accordingly, it outlines US reactions in order to preempt threats, defeat ongoing harm, and deter future harm.

Aegis

Covert Deception, Strategic Fraud, and the Rule of Prohibited Intervention

Gary Corn   Thu, Sep 24, 2020, 12:15 PM

If information is power, then the corruption of information is the erosion, if not the outright usurpation, of power. This is especially true in the information age, where developments in the technological structure and global interconnectedness of information and telecommunications infrastructure have enabled states to engage in malicious influence campaigns at an unprecedented scope, scale, depth, and speed.

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