Latest in Trade and Security
On July 12, President Trump surprisingly decided not to levy a quota on uranium imports, departing from his past enthusiasm for limiting purchases from abroad. The yearlong lead-up serves as the latest example of the president’s extensive power over trade.
Last month, Ellie Geranmayeh and Manuel Lafont Rapnouil wrote a report for the European Council on Foreign Relations, arguing that Europe needed to hit back hard against U.S. secondary sanctions targeting Iran. They recommended that Europe consider measures such as creating new financial channels outside U.S. control, investigating European companies that comply too readily with U.S. threats and targeting U.S. companies in retaliation for sweeping U.S.
U.S. and Chinese Negotiators Make Contact Following the G-20 Summit
On May 30, the White House announced yet another new policy aimed at addressing the purported crisis of unlawful immigration across the U.S.-Mexico border. President Trump’s statement proposes a dramatic new strategy—putting tariffs on U.S. imports from Mexico unless and until Mexico takes steps to reduce illegal immigration into the United States:
On May 15, President Trump once again declared a national emergency to invoke legal authority to make sweeping changes to U.S. policy, this time to secure the telecommunications supply chain. I’ve already made my views clear on Huawei’s suitability for U.S. markets and the need for a blanket ban on Chinese-sourced telecommunications equipment in U.S. infrastructure.
The United States has significantly ratcheted up its trade war with China in recent weeks by firing two new shots. First, President Trump signed an executive order that is expected to restrict Chinese telecommunications companies Huawei and ZTE Corp. from selling their equipment and services in the United States.
U.S. Treasury Secretary Steven Mnuchin and U.S. Trade Representative Robert Lighthizer concluded another round of trade talks with their Chinese counterparts last week in Beijing. Much of this round centered on how to handle key structural issues surrounding technology transfer and data storage.
On March 14, Treasury Secretary Steve Mnuchin shared with reporters that the Trump-Xi summit, originally scheduled for late March, would be pushed back because American and Chinese trade negotiators are still working to address unspecified issues. The Wall Street Journal reported on March 19 that negotiators are hoping to finalize a deal by late April.
On Jan. 31, the governments of France, Germany and the United Kingdom formally announced the establishment of the Instrument in Support of Trade Exchanges (INSTEX), a Special Purpose Vehicle dedicated to facilitating trade between European economic actors and Iran. The creation of INSTEX by the three countries—known as the E3—followed months of negotiations in the wake of the United States’s 2018 exit from the Iran nuclear deal.
Amid the ongoing U.S.-China trade talks, China has fast-tracked a piece of legislation that serves as its most immediate answer to U.S. concerns regarding Chinese state-directed economic policies and barriers to market access. The draft Foreign Investment Law intends to reform China’s foreign investment regime; its vague provisions, however, will have more far-reaching national security implications for the United States.