Author’s Note: After drafting the post below, I belatedly checked Lawfare’s recent posts to ensure I’m not preempted. And there I found this terrific post by my colleague Megan Reiss, covering a great deal of the same ground on the Section 231 and 241 issues (and doing a much better job of contextualizing them).
Latest in Sanctions
In a recently published article, “Taking Steel Seizure Seriously: The Iran Nuclear Agreement and the Separation of Powers,” 86 Fordham L. Rev. 1199 (2017), Steven Menashi and I question the constitutional validity of President Barack Obama's decision, as part of the 2015 Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action agreement with Iran and five other countries, to repeal, in effect, 17 different Iran-related nuclear sanctions provisions for the agreement’s 15-year term.
On Nov. 20, the Treasury Department’s Office of Foreign Assets Control, which enforces sanctions, identified and designated individuals and entities connected to an operation by the Quds force, the special forces division of Iran’s Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) to print counterfeit Yemeni money worth hundreds of millions of U.S. dollars using European equipment.
Did the sanctions regime that preceded the Iran nuclear deal enable the regime's most notorious actor, the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC)?
The Washington Post reported yesterday that next week, President Trump may announce that he will “decertify” the Iran nuclear deal because it is not in the interest of the United States to continue implementing it.
President Donald Trump released an executive order yesterday declaring, in effect, the time has come for the international community—China, in particular—to choose sides over North Korea.
The Grand Chamber of the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) has issued judgments in two appeals concerning EU counterterrorism sanctions against Hamas and the LTTE (Tamil Tigers).
As cybercrime spreads in its many mutations, governments and regulators across the globe continue to develop a variety of solutions. One regulatory method that has gained in popularity and sophistication in recent years is the financial response to cybercrime. The United States in particular has explored financial sanctions at the “front end,” to deprive cybercriminals of access to financial channels, and financial penalties at the “back end,” particularly asset forfeiture, to recover the proceeds of criminal activity.
The threat posed by the Iranian regime was one focus of a recent Academic Exchange (AE) retreat of International Relations specialists and international lawyers. Even with the reelection of President Hassan Rouhani, the Iranian regime poses a two-pronged threat to the Persian Gulf and the Middle East. For one thing, Iran is poised to gain on the ground in Syria, Yemen, and elsewhere. The need to counter Iran’s ground game is the catalyst for President Trump’s efforts to collaborate with Persian Gulf states.
Why Is the US More Likely to Sanction Chinese Companies for Supporting Iran than for Supporting North Korea?
Lost amid the fallout of President Trump’s firing of FBI Director James Comey last week was the U.S. Treasury Department’s announcement of new sanctions on individuals and companies found to be supporting Iran’s missile program. Four of the seven new sanctions targets are Chinese. This matters because although this is the second time since President Trump has taken office that the U.S.