Cyberspace may be a domain of military operations, but it is not predominantly so. Civil-military relations in the United States must adapt to new demands or cyberspace may be irretrievably diminished.
Latest in persistent engagement
Documents like CYBERCOM's 2018 Command Vision are less provocative in the context of other directives, but who in the U.S. government takes precedence in constructing cyber norms?
The Cyberspace Solarium Commission report can be added to the list of evidence that change in U.S. national cybersecurity thinking—although neither linear nor easy—is occurring.
A response to Ben Jensen on persistent engagement.
In 2018, U.S. cyber strategy shifted from a reactive, deterrence-based approach to the forward-postured, proactive policy of persistent engagement. Persistent engagement broadly entails more active defense against cyberattacks and a more constant pace of operations. The strategy rests on theoretical conceptions of the cyber domain recently advanced by scholars, but also on the argument that America’s competitors have long been practicing the same. For example, U.S.
In a recent Lawfare essay, Jim Miller and Neal Pollard offer an important and positive assessment of the strategy of persistent engagement, a strategic approach designed to thwart adversary cyberspace campaigns by continuously anticipating and exploiting vulner
In 2018, U.S. Cyber Command was elevated to a unified combatant command, one of only four of these functional commands in the U.S. military. To harken the institution’s independence, Cyber Command released a strategic vision announcing a new concept of persistent engagement. The document explained that:
Michael P. Fischerkeller and Richard J. Harknett have recently produced excellent writing on persistent engagement, a central element of U.S. Cyber Command’s (USCYBERCOM’s)—and the nation’s—strategy for cyberspace.
In a recent Lawfare post, Max Smeets examines the implications of the shift in U.S. strategic thinking on cyberspace. He correctly notes that U.S.