Latest in nuclear weapons
As countries turn to Russia and China to jump-start their civilian nuclear programs, the next U.S. president will be forced to compete with rivals to protect the nonproliferation regime. The Atomic Energy Act of 1954 governs the export of U.S. nuclear technology.
Every year, in early August, new articles appear that debate whether the dropping of the atomic bombs in 1945 was justified. Earlier this month, the 75th anniversary of the Hiroshima and Nagasaki attacks, was no exception.
The UAE builds the first civilian nuclear reactor in the Middle East and Saudi Arabia moves down the path to building a nuclear weapon. Dana, Jamil, Jodi, and Les discuss the geopolitical ramifications of a nuclear powered Middle East. Are 123 agreements useful anymore? Will the United States be able to prevent nuclear proliferation? How does china play into all of this? All these questions and more answered in this week’s Fault Lines.
Despite the optics of a recent resolution at the International Atomic Energy Agency, Europe continues to oppose the U.S. policy line on Iran.
In recent years, there has been a creeping acceptance of the proliferation of nuclear weapons. It's time to restart the debate about the morality of nuclear weapons.
A review of Fred Kaplan, “The Bomb: Presidents, Generals, and the Secret History of Nuclear War” (Simon & Schuster, 2020).
The last treaty that limits the United States’s and Russia’s nuclear weapons, the New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (New START), will expire in February 2021 unless both states agree to its extension. Opponents of extension, including some U.S. officials, have argued against extending the treaty by citing Russia’s new, developmental strategic weapons, which they claim will not be covered by the treaty. Yet the reality is more complex.
Editor’s Note: This article originally appeared on Order from Chaos.
President Trump announced on Oct. 20 that the United States would pull out of the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty, a 1987 bilateral agreement prohibiting the United States and Russia from possessing, producing or test-flying ground-launched ballistic and cruise missiles with a range of 500 to 5,500 kilometers and their launchers.
Editor’s Note: As the world watches North Korea with a mix of alarm and nausea, officials can agree that no one wants new nuclear powers—especially ones led by erratic and bellicose leaders. But at times prevention fails, and policy options for dealing with such powers are scant. Nicholas Miller at Dartmouth takes on this question, arguing that the current approach, especially the non-proliferation treaty, can often do more harm than good.
***