To the extent that Iran targets U.S. audiences in sustained disinformation campaigns, it still typically aims to broadly promote Iranian interests rather than attempting to induce a specific result in American domestic affairs.
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Tackling disinformation requires humility, calm and attention to details as the threat evolves and becomes more complex: Tropes such as the “Russian playbook” are no longer helpful ahead of the November election.
Within the Department of Defense, terms such as “information warfare” and “psychological operations” have elastic and ambiguous meanings. What does this reveal about the Department’s approach to non-kinetic operations?
As trade-wars proliferate, technological rivalries intensify and U.S. corporations take public positions on hot-button social issues, American businesses will increasingly find themselves in the crosshairs of nation-state sponsored disinformation operations.
Cyberattacks don’t magically happen; they involve a series of steps. And far from being helpless, defenders can disrupt the attack at any of those steps. This framing has led to something called the “cybersecurity kill chain”: a way of thinking about cyber defense in terms of disrupting the attacker’s process.
On November 30th, the House passed H.R. 6393, the Intelligence Authorization Act for FY'17. While it remains to be seen what if anything ultimately emerges at the end of the process, I'd like to highlight some items in the current bill that I found particularly interesting:
- two involve attempts to give SSCI and HPSCI greater awareness of presidential policy directives and MOUs involving the IC;