In a speech on Tuesday, Barr outlined a major change in the U.S. government’s position on encryption: adding lawful access to a system reduces its security.
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Barr’s speech on encryption mostly recycles old arguments but does say something new and important that changes the policy debate on exceptional access.
The Levy-Robinson proposal is no less dangerous a backdoor than any others that have been proposed.
Rather than continuing to politicize encryption, instead the lessons learned from the decades-long crypto policy debate should be used to inform the process of developing Exceptional Access technology.Rather than continuing to politicize encryption, instead the lessons learned from the decades-long crypto policy debate should be used to inform the process of developing Exceptional Access technology.
If we fear abuse of law-enforcement powers under a Trump administration, that is reason to move towards the technically constrainable and enforceable transparency of split-key exceptional access mechanisms rather than towards the alternative of unconstrained, non-transparent capabilities such as device hacking.
ODNI's letter seems to be more about a presumption of the report's content was than what was actually present. More critically, ODNI's response does not address the crucial issue in the encryption debate: is widespread use of secure—non backdoored, frontdoored, exceptional access—encryption technologies in our national-security interest?