Latest in CYBERCOM
Documents like CYBERCOM's 2018 Command Vision are less provocative in the context of other directives, but who in the U.S. government takes precedence in constructing cyber norms?
The Trickbot takedown and such military operations are a good idea only in cases that meet a five-part test of imminence, severity, overseas focus, nation-state adversary, and military as a last-ish resort.
U.S. Cyber Command is hosting its annual legal conference this Thursday (March 4th), and all are welcome to (virtually) attend.
Are big changes afoot at Cyber Command? What are the relevant legal constraints?
For the first time, it appears, U.S. Cyber Command has conducted a disruption operation against a non-state actor outside the context of war. Here’s what you need to know.
A blockbuster article by David Sanger and Nicole Perlroth in the New York Times reports U.S. Cyber Command operations to hold at-risk at least some aspects of the electric power grid in Russia. The story raises a host of legal and policy questions.
DOD’s 2018 Cyber Strategy document is drawing attention because of its reference to “defense forward.” What does that mean? Let’s have a close look, in context with the recently-enacted NDAA and recent changes to PPD-20.
1. Hold up. Is this “DOD Cyber Strategy” the same thing as the “National Cyber Strategy”?
The next National Defense Authorization Act (the NDAA FY’18) is nearing the finish line. A Conference Report is now available, and so the time has come for a closer look at some of the key provisions of interest to Lawfare readers. My colleague Scott Anderson is going to post a broad overview shortly. For my part, I’d like to walk you through the “Cyberspace-Related Matters” section (sections 1631-1649C).
Friday morning, the White House announced it will elevate Cyber Command to a full unified combatant command. Within 60 days, the Secretary of Defense will recommend whether Cyber Command should also be split from the National Security Agency.