Judge Brett Kavanaugh has gone out of his way to express support for the NSA's bulk collection of call detail records and opposition to net neutrality in alarmingly activist fashion.
Latest in Brett Kavanaugh
During the fourth day of hearings on Judge Brett Kavanaugh's nomination to the Supreme Court, two experts testified on matters that may be of interest to Lawfare readers. Rebecca Ingber, associate professor at Boston University School of Law and contributing editor for Lawfare, testified about Judge Kavanaugh's approaches to executive deference on national security matters and to international law.
Three different batches of documents relating to the Supreme Court nominee’s time in the Bush White House caused conflict on the first day of confirmation proceedings.
A bibliography of the Supreme Court nominee’s published writings and public comments on foreign relations, national security and related issues.
Brett Kavanaugh's Failure to Acknowledge the Changes in Communications Technology: The Implications for Privacy
What the president’s nominee to the Supreme Court missed in his decision in Klayman v. Obama.
Understanding the Supreme Court nominee's minimalist view of the courts’ role in foreign affairs and security.
How might a Justice Kavanaugh approach search and seizure cases ?
Many of the those arguing that overruling Morrison v. Olson wouldn’t impact Mueller’s independence have cited Morrison as the basis for arguing against a bill intended to reaffirm Mueller’s independence.
Twenty years ago, Brett Kavanaugh and I were on the team that drafted Kenneth Starr’s impeachment referral. Here’s what the Supreme Court nominee did and did not do.
Lawfare's Alex Loomis has a fascinating new paper up on SSRN about the scope of Congress's Article I power to "define and punish . . . Offences against the Law of Nations." But it's important to stress what Alex's article does not answer: Although Jack has suggested that Alex's analysis is relevant to the ongoing D.C. Circuit litigation in Al Bahlul over the constitutional powerof Guantánamo military commissions to try offenses like inchoate conspiracy, it goes only to the Article I question presented therein--whether Congress has the power to define inchoate conspiracy as an offense against the law of nations, as it has done in 10 U.S.C. § 950t(29). A wholly separate question--which Alex's paper does not seek to answer (see, e.g., footnote 357)--is whether Article III nevertheless prohibits a military, as opposed to civilian, court from trying the offense. As this post explains, there are compelling reasons why Congress should receive less deference in that context.