Latest in Apple


Apple's Cloud Key Vault and Secure Law Enforcement Access

Michael Specter and the “Keys Under Doormats” (KUD) group have an interesting post, entitled “Apple's Cloud Key Vault, Exceptional Access, and False Equivalences” responding to my earlier post on Apple’s Cloud Key Vault.

The conversation so far has meandered somewhat over different sites, so if you’ve not been following along, the conversation thus far is:


Apple's Cloud Key Vault, Exceptional Access, and False Equivalences

Author’s note: Despite appearing under my byline, this post actually represents the work of a larger group. The Keys Under Doormats group includes Harold Abelson, Ross Anderson, Steven M. Bellovin, Josh Benaloh, Matt Blaze,Whitfield Diffie, John Gilmore, Matthew Green, Susan Landau, Peter G. Neumann, Ronald L. Rivest, Jeffrey I. Schiller, Bruce Schneier, Michael A.


TouchID and the Exigent iPhone

As a matter of established legal precedent, the police can compel someone to provide their fingerprint onto a fingerprint reader. Equally well-established is that exigent circumstances—including "the need to prevent the imminent destruction of evidence in individual cases"—can justify conducting a search before obtaining a warrant.


The Apple Vulnerability Disclosure Question -- Looks Like I Will Win

A few weeks ago, as anyone who is not living under a rock will remember, the FBI withdrew its effort to force Apple to unlock an iPhone because, as it told the court, it gained access to the phone through a previously undisclosed vulnerability. Apple then publicly turned around and asked the FBI to disclose the vulnerability that it had found to it -- a request that Ben characterized as digital chutzpah.

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