Apple’s legal obligations under CALEA challenge the argument that Apple could be doing more to help law enforcement.
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FaceTime and iMessage have a cryptographic architecture that enables prospective wiretapping, but there is reason to believe that Apple not is fully complying with lawful pen-register and trap-and-trace court orders.
With the Texas church shooting having put encryption back on the front burner, I claim that Apple is becoming the FBI's crazy ex-girlfriend in Silicon Valley—and offer the tapes to prove it.
Upgrades in Apple's forthcoming operating system update will complicate electronic search efforts at the border.
Alan Z. Rozenshtein on Digital Communications and Data Storage Companies as "Surveillance Intermediaries"
Alan Z. Rozenshtein, a former contributor to Lawfare who now works at DOJ, has a new article forthcoming in Stanford Law Review, "Surveillance Intermediaries," analyzing the role of corporate actors such as Apple, Google, Facebook, and others, that dominate digital communications and data storage, situated between government and targets of surveillance.
Author’s note: Despite appearing under my byline, this post actually represents the work of a larger group.
In the news round-up, Alan Cohn and I dive deep on the Government Oversight Committee's report on the OPM Hack, the ongoing fight between Apple and the EU, and the latest PlayPen decision in United States v. Torres.
A researcher has now demonstrated it is possible to unlock an iPhone using a technique the FBI claimed would not work in the San Bernardino controversy earlier this year, further strengthening the case against legislative mandates on encryption.
Continuing the conversation on Apple's Cloud Key Vault and its significance to the broader question of secure lawful access.
We should dispel arguments that the kinds of backups Apple detailed in a recent Blackhat talk are equivalent to law enforcement exceptional access schemes.