The front page of the New York Times carried a story this Sunday that would have commanded the news cycle many years ago. It describes in previously-unappreciated detail the complex nature and large scale of the U.S.
Latest in Al Shabaab
DOD has announced an airstrike on an al Shabaab official in Somalia:
Charlie Savage’s piece on the legal basis for the March 5 U.S. strike against an al Shabaab training camp, which allegedly killed 150 fighters, raises the intriguing question of whether the AUMF has been stretched yet again, this time to justify U.S. operations against al Shabaab as a whole.
These days, when the United States plays the lead role in using lethal force or detaining and interrogating prisoners, the force typically involves only airpower and detention-and-interrogation typically are just transient. This has the effect of tamping down the political, legal, and diplomatic headaches that follow from using boots-on-the-ground to conduct raids and from holding detainees for the long term. But these are not the only means by which to tamp down those frictions.
Airstrikes Outside Areas of Active Hostilities: Attacks in Somalia and Questions About the Current Shape of the Policy
Just this morning, I was thinking that things have been rather quiet with respect to media coverage of U.S. operations against AQ and AQ affiliates in places like Pakistan, Yemen, and Somalia. Well...
A few days ago, Ashley had an excellent post flagging an important shift in U.S.
A few days ago, Paul McCleary at Foreign Policy reported on U.S. airstrikes against al Shabaab, undertaken in defense of AMISOM forces. McCleary asked, “Is there a new U.S. airstrike policy in East Africa?” My question is, “Is there a new legal theory supporting U.S. airstrikes against al Shabaab?” The most likely of possible answers: The United States could be acting on behalf of the Somali government, assisting it in its non-international armed conflict with al Shabaab.