Dr. Timothy R. Heath is a Senior International Defense Researcher with the nonprofit, nonpartisan RAND Corporation. He has over 15 years experience as a China specialist within the U.S. government and joined RAND in 2014. Heath has authored numerous studies, articles and one book, "China’s New Governing Party Paradigm: Political Renewal and the Pursuit of National Rejuvenation" (2014). He earned his PhD in Political Science from George Mason University.
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The combination of a weakening strategic situation and an increasingly despotic regime has left Xi with few constraints on his power, leaving many to fear that he could risk military adventurism as a diversion from China’s deteriorating situation.
While wargames offer the possibility of exploring the potential outcomes of a U.S.-China war, they have several shortcomings that must be considered in order to more incisively explore key issues such as deterrence and escalation management.
At China’s Central Foreign Relations Work Conference—an infrequently-held high level strategy session on the nation’s foreign policy—convened on June 23, 2018, Chinese leaders issued an array of foreign policy directives designed to strengthen the activist foreign policy outlined by Xi at the previous foreign affairs work conference held in 2014.
Dueling high level strategy documents in both the United States and China portend an intensifying competition for leadership and influence at the global systemic level. The coming years are likely to see a deepening contest in the diplomatic, economic, cyber, and information domains, even as the risks of major war remain low. Although the U.S. strategy has garnered considerable scrutiny, less attention has been paid to the directives outlined in key official Chinese strategy documents.
For China, the first of its two “centennial anniversaries”—in 2021 (100 years since the Chinese Communist Party’s (CPP) founding) and 2049 (100 years since the founding of the People’s Republic of China) —arrives in just four years. Although Beijing has publicly disavowed any timeline for unification with Taiwan, there is little question that CCP leaders would prefer the issue to be settled by then, or at least to oversee sufficient progress to justify its stewardship of the country’s revitalization.