As a foreign sovereign state, China can take a more creative approach to responding—or not—to lawsuits filed against it in U.S. courts concerning the coronavirus.
Sean A. Mirski practices a combination of appellate and international law at Arnold & Porter in Washington, DC, with a focus on public international, national security and foreign relations law. He is also a Visiting Scholar at the Hoover Institution. He clerked for Justice Samuel A. Alito, Jr., on the United States Supreme Court, and for then-Judge Brett M. Kavanaugh on the United States Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit. He also served as Special Counsel to the General Counsel of the U.S. Department of Defense. He graduated magna cum laude from Harvard Law School, where he served as Supreme Court Chair for the Harvard Law Review.
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Senate Judiciary Committee Examines the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act and Coronavirus-Related Suits Against China
The Senate Judiciary Committee held a hearing on “the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act, Coronavirus, and Addressing China’s Culpability”—and the proceedings demonstrated that this corner of foreign relations law has become a political lightning rod.
Several individuals, small businesses and states have filed a total of at least 14 different suits against China (and affiliated entities and officials) based on its perceived culpability in causing the coronavirus pandemic.
One year ago, President Trump allowed Americans with claims to property confiscated by the Cuban government to sue any entity that “traffics” in that property. But a recent decision by a Florida district court has pruned the list of potential plaintiffs substantially.
Last week, Philippine Foreign Secretary Albert del Rosario made his opening statement before the tribunal overseeing Manila’s arbitration against China. (As regular readers will remember, the Philippines has brought its case under the auspices of the U.N. Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS).
As I explained in this legal primer, the South China Sea dispute has primarily revolved around two distinct legal quarrels: a dispute over territory and a dispute over the substance and application of maritime law.
Over at The National Interest, I’ve written an article parsing this distinction and what it means for the American approach to the South China Sea. I argue that
Much anticipated for any number of reasons, Zivotofsky was perhaps most awaited for the valuable contribution it was to make in the form of its analysis of the scope of exclusive executive power. This analysis was expected to begin to answer a key question lingering after Justice Jackson’s Youngstown concurrence.