Earlier this September, law enforcement officials from the Five Eyes intelligence alliance—made up of Australia, Canada, New Zealand, the United Kingdom, and the United States—met in Australia and issued a Statement of Principles on Access to Evidence and Encryption.
Susan Landau is Bridge Professor in the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy and the School of Engineering, Department of Computer Science, Tufts University. Her new book, "Listening In: Cybersecurity in an Insecure Age," was recently published by Yale University Press. Landau has testified before Congress and briefed U.S. and European policymakers on encryption, surveillance, and cybersecurity issues. Landau has been a Senior Staff Privacy Analyst at Google, a Distinguished Engineer at Sun Microsystems, and a faculty member at Worcester Polytechnic Institute, the University of Massachusetts and Wesleyan University. She is a member of the Cybersecurity Hall of Fame, a fellow of the American Association for the Advancement of Science and of the Association for Computing Machinery.
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Brett Kavanaugh's Failure to Acknowledge the Changes in Communications Technology: The Implications for Privacy
Facebook became available to the general public in 2006; Apple's smartphone was announced the following year. In little over a decade, the devices, and the communications they engender, have become ubiquitous. Fully 95 percent of Americans own cell phones; 77 percent, smartphones. We carry mobile devices everywhere, using them to carry out a multitude of tasks.
What’s Involved in Vetting a Security Protocol: Why Ray Ozzie’s Proposal for Exceptional Access Does Not Pass Muster
For almost a decade, the FBI has been stating that law enforcement is “going dark"—meaning it is increasingly unable to listen in to communications and, more recently, to open locked devices in which important evidence lives.
Building on Sand Isn’t Stable: Correcting a Misunderstanding of the National Academies Report on Encryption
The encryption debate is messy. In any debate that involves technology—encryption, security systems and policy, law enforcement, and national security access—the incomparable complexities and tradeoffs make choices complicated. That's why getting the facts absolutely right matters. To that end, I’m offering a small, but significant, correction to a post Alan Rozenshtein wrote on Lawfare on March 29.
The Russians are coming. What are we going to do about it?
Revelations on the FBI’s Unlocking of the San Bernardino iPhone: Maybe the Future Isn't Going Dark After All
Lawfare readers may be familiar with the San Bernardino case in which the FBI took Apple to court over the locked iPhone of the dead terrorist. I certainly am. I testified in Congress about the case in March 2016 and recently published a book on whether law enforcement should have exceptional access to locked devices. (Short answer: no).
Finally, Mark Zuckerberg has spoken. The short version of his response? “We have a responsibility to protect your data, and if we can't then we don't deserve to serve you.” But Zuckerberg is wrong. The Cambridge Analytica scandal is not about a failure to secure users’ data; it is a failure to protect the privacy of users’ data.