Susan Landau is Bridge Professor in the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy and the School of Engineering, Department of Computer Science, Tufts University. Her new book, "Listening In: Cybersecurity in an Insecure Age," was recently published by Yale University Press. Landau has testified before Congress and briefed U.S. and European policymakers on encryption, surveillance, and cybersecurity issues. Landau has been a Senior Staff Privacy Analyst at Google, a Distinguished Engineer at Sun Microsystems, and a faculty member at Worcester Polytechnic Institute, the University of Massachusetts and Wesleyan University. She is a member of the Cybersecurity Hall of Fame, a fellow of the American Association for the Advancement of Science and of the Association for Computing Machinery.
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Chinese and Russian eavesdropping on President Trump’s calls on his personal smartphone points out the need for securing communications.
The statement is an effort by the intelligence alliance to show support for a new Australian proposal on lawful access to encrypted devices. But it ignores technical realities—and certain important signatures are missing.
What the president’s nominee to the Supreme Court missed in his decision in Klayman v. Obama.
Ray Ozzie’s proposal for exceptional access has the virtue of being simple. But security can be subtle, and simple solutions often miss critical aspects. This one has.
The National Academies’ report on “Decrypting the Encryption Debate” says some computer-security experts have ideas for implementing secure exceptional access to encrypted systems—but that’s a far cry from saying they’re “trying to build” them.
A year and a half past the 2016 U.S. presidential election, it’s clear that that we are not paying sufficient attention to Russian efforts in “hybrid warfare.”
The FBI could have tried harder to open the San Bernardino phone before it resorted to the courts.