Susan Landau is Bridge Professor in The Fletcher School and Tufts School of Engineering, Department of Computer Science, Tufts University. Her new book, "People Count: Contact-Tracing Apps and Public Health" will be published by MIT Press in April 2021; she has also written several books on wiretap and encryption policy. Landau has testified before Congress and briefed U.S. and European policymakers on encryption, surveillance, and cybersecurity issues. Landau has been a Senior Staff Privacy Analyst at Google, a Distinguished Engineer at Sun Microsystems, and a faculty member at Worcester Polytechnic Institute, the University of Massachusetts and Wesleyan University. She is a member of the Cybersecurity Hall of Fame, a fellow of the American Association for the Advancement of Science and of the Association for Computing Machinery.
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Many have discussed the shortcomings of contract-tracing apps during the pandemic. The real problem is the lack of adequate social and public health infrastructure in the U.S.
A new report shows the widespread use by law enforcement of tools that circumvent encryption barriers.
My new paper examines three critical issues in the NSA’s collection of Call Detail Records.
Critics focus on the privacy cost of contact tracing. But it’s important to examine the disparate privacy implications for the most vulnerable communities.
The novel coronavirus presents unique challenges. "Contact tracing” may not work. But other uses of cellphone data tracking could play some role in mitigating the virus’s spread.
Determining whether surveillance will help combat the virus requires understanding how the coronavirus spreads and how cellphone tracking works.
As the debate over law enforcement access to encrypted communications continues, commentators and policymakers often overlook an instructive historical example.