Patrick Hulme is a Ph.D. student in political science at UCSD, where he focuses on congressional-executive relations in U.S. foreign policy, U.S.-China relations, and international security. He is a graduate student researcher for the Center for Peace and Security Studies (cPASS), the 21st Century China Center, and the Institute on Global Conflict and Cooperation (IGCC). He holds a J.D. from the UCLA School of Law.
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Despite critiques that the president exercises unilateral authority over use-of-force decisions, much of the historical evidence reflects significant congressional restraint on the executive branch.
Current congressional action related to the possible repeal of outdated force authorizations against Iraq will do little to affect the executive branch’s use of military force behavior in the region.
Although Congress was not represented in President Kennedy’s close group of decision-makers during the Cuban missile crisis, the sentiment expressed by the legislative branch heavily influenced decision-making on both sides of the Iron Curtain during the confrontation.
Amidst an ongoing debate over aging AUMFs, how does the president view the war powers? Biden's long tenure in the federal government suggests that while he might claim broad war authority, he will not use major force absent significant congressional support.
An ongoing foreign policy debate over whether the United States should clarify a security guarantee to Taiwan needs to consider Congress's role in such a policy.
While President Trump can decide whether to use force against Iran, Congress has taken steps that may make him unwilling to do so.
Since President Truman’s “police action” in the Korean War, scholars in law and political science have considered the possibility that presidents would attempt to substitute congressional authorization with authorization from an international organization when using military force.