A proposal for a memorandum of understanding concerning offensive cyber effects operations in systems or networks based in allied territory.
Max Smeets is a senior researcher at the Center for Security Studies (CSS). He is also an Affiliate at Stanford University Center for International Security and Cooperation and Research Associate at the Centre for Technology and Global Affairs, University of Oxford. He was awarded the annual 2018 Amos Perlmutter Prize of the Journal of Strategic Studies for the most outstanding manuscript submitted for publication by a junior faculty member. In 2015, he also received the Young Writers Award of the German Marshall Fund, for an article written together with George Bogden. Max was previously a postdoctoral fellow and lecturer at Stanford University CISAC and a College Lecturer at Keble College, University of Oxford. He has also held research and fellowship positions at New America, Columbia University SIPA, Sciences Po CERI and NATO CCD COE. Before his academic career, Max has worked in finance in London and Amsterdam. He received a BA in Economics, Politics and Statistics summa cum laude from University College Roosevelt, Utrecht University and an M.Phil (Brasenose College) and DPhil (St. John’s College) in International Relations from the University of Oxford.
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