Documents like CYBERCOM's 2018 Command Vision are less provocative in the context of other directives, but who in the U.S. government takes precedence in constructing cyber norms?
Dr. Michael P. Fischerkeller is a research staff member in the Information, Technology and Systems Division at the Institute for Defense Analyses, where he has spent 20 years supporting the Office of the Secretary of Defense, Joint Chiefs of Staff, and Combatant and Multi-National Force commanders.
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States will struggle to find cyber relevance in international law until new instruments of international law—or adaptations of current law—account for the core features of the cyber strategic environment.
A response to Ben Jensen on persistent engagement.
Cost imposition should be reconceptualized to align with the realities of cyber strategic competition.
In a recent Lawfare essay, Jim Miller and Neal Pollard offer an important and positive assessment of the strategy of persistent engagement, a strategic approach designed to thwart adversary cyberspace campaigns by continuously anticipating and exploiting vulner
In a recent Lawfare post, Max Smeets examines the implications of the shift in U.S. strategic thinking on cyberspace. He correctly notes that U.S.
The cyber-strategic environment comprises two strategic spaces—armed conflict and the competitive space short of armed conflict. Pursuing national objectives requires strategies that can succeed in the structural and dynamic realities of each of these spaces.