Matt Bishop

Matt Bishop is a Professor in the Dept. of Computer Science at the University of California, Davis, and co-director of the Computer Security Laboratory there. He received his Ph.D. from Purdue University in 1984. His main research area is the analysis of vulnerabilities in computer systems. He has been active in election work, and electronic voting system work, since 2003. He was on the RABA team that performed a red team test of Maryland's electronic voting systems in 2004, on the Florida team that examined electronic voting systems for problems after the 2006 Congressional District 13 election, and co-led the technical part of the California Top-to-Bottom Review of electronic voting systems used in the state of California. His textbook, "Computer Security: Art and Science," is widely used in university courses on computer security.

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Election Security

Open-Source Software Won't Ensure Election Security

The technology behind elections is hard to get right. Elections require security. They also require transparency: anyone should be able to observe enough of the election process, from distribution of ballots, to the counting and canvassing of votes, to verify that the reported winners really won. But if people vote on computers or votes are tallied by computers, key steps of the election are not transparent and additional measures are needed to confirm the results.