Aegis
Cybersecurity Under the Ocean: Submarine Cables and US National Security
Submarine cables' security and resiliency are vital to the global internet as we know it—but this infrastructure faces many risks that policymakers must help tackle.
Justin Sherman is a nonresident fellow at the Atlantic Council's Cyber Statecraft Initiative and a senior fellow at Duke University's Sanford School of Public Policy, where he runs its data brokerage research project.
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Submarine cables' security and resiliency are vital to the global internet as we know it—but this infrastructure faces many risks that policymakers must help tackle.
A new bill effectively seeks to bring back Trump’s TikTok ban. While better at distinguishing between risks, its one-size-fits-all approach raises questions.
In 2015, a data broker helped anti-abortion groups target women in clinic waiting rooms. The Massachusetts attorney general decided to act.
Three data brokers knowingly sold Americans’ data to scammers—and the Department of Justice charged them.
The laws already in California and Vermont do not put any meaningful controls on companies selling, licensing and otherwise sharing Americans’ sensitive data on the open market—and the new bills are no different.
Rather than focusing on single vectors of data collection and transmission, the U.S. government must respond comprehensively to the many vectors of data collection, aggregation, buying, selling and sharing that pose risks to national security.
The FCC issued an order barring China Telecom from providing telecommunications services in the United States.