John Bellinger

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John B. Bellinger III is a partner in the international and national security law practices at Arnold & Porter in Washington, DC. He is also Adjunct Senior Fellow in International and National Security Law at the Council on Foreign Relations. He served as The Legal Adviser for the Department of State from 2005–2009, as Senior Associate Counsel to the President and Legal Adviser to the National Security Council at the White House from 2001–2005, and as Counsel for National Security Matters in the Criminal Division of the Department of Justice from 1997–2001.

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Jan. 6, 2021 Violence in the Capitol

Donald Trump Is Still a Danger to Our National Security

In December 2015, I wrote a post for Lawfare entitled “Donald Trump Is a Danger to Our National Security,” in which I argued that Trump not only lacked “the qualifications to be president, he is actually endangering our national security right now by his hate-filled and divisive rhetoric.” I concluded “Donald Trump not only would be a dangerous president, he is making us less safe as a candidate.” At the time, I may have been the first national security official to write publicly that Trump was and w

Cuba

Suits Under Title III of the Helms-Burton Act Suffer Their First Significant Setback

One year ago, President Trump allowed Americans with claims to property confiscated by the Cuban government to sue any entity that “traffics” in that property. But a recent decision by a Florida district court has pruned the list of potential plaintiffs substantially.

Cuba

The First Year of Helms Burton Lawsuits

One year ago, the Trump administration announced that, for the first time in 23 years, the President would cease to suspend Title III of the Helms-Burton Act and would instead allow U.S. nationals to sue persons and companies that “traffic” in property expropriated by the Cuban government after the start of the Cuban Revolution. Presidents Clinton, Bush, and Obama had suspended Title III from 1996-2017, because they concluded that activation of the provision would produce a flood of complex lawsuits in U.S. courts and cause diplomatic friction with close allies.