The New York Times reports that the Trump administration has accelerated a secret American program to sabotage Iran’s missiles and rockets by inserting faulty parts and materials into Iran’s aerospace supply chains.
Dr. Herb Lin is senior research scholar for cyber policy and security at the Center for International Security and Cooperation and Hank J. Holland Fellow in Cyber Policy and Security at the Hoover Institution, both at Stanford University. His research interests relate broadly to policy-related dimensions of cybersecurity and cyberspace, and he is particularly interested in and knowledgeable about the use of offensive operations in cyberspace, especially as instruments of national policy. In addition to his positions at Stanford University, he is Chief Scientist, Emeritus for the Computer Science and Telecommunications Board, National Research Council (NRC) of the National Academies, where he served from 1990 through 2014 as study director of major projects on public policy and information technology, and Adjunct Senior Research Scholar and Senior Fellow in Cybersecurity (not in residence) at the Saltzman Institute for War and Peace Studies in the School for International and Public Affairs at Columbia University. Prior to his NRC service, he was a professional staff member and staff scientist for the House Armed Services Committee (1986-1990), where his portfolio included defense policy and arms control issues. He received his doctorate in physics from MIT.
Subscribe to this Lawfare contributor via RSS.
Today the Brookings Institution is publishing our edited volume, "Bytes, Bombs, and Spies: The Strategic Dimensions of Offensive Cyber Operations." And here is
What would it mean if “hacking back” was interpreted as violating the CFAA?
The new U.S. Cyber Command vision and the Department of Defense Cyber Strategy embody a fundamental reorientation in strategic thinking.
The International Committee of the Red Cross can serve as a model for a new international organization that would provide neutral, impartial and independent assistance to entities affected by serious cyberattacks.
There has never been a publicly documented incident of hardware supply chain compromise at the fabrication level originating abroad—until now.
There are not enough ways to fight foreign information operations. Here’s how researchers can start coming up with new ones.