I don’t disagree with much that Alexei Bulazel, Sophia d’Antoine, Perri Adams and Dave Aitel wrote on Huawei and risk mitigation, and endorse almost all of their argument.
Dr. Herb Lin is senior research scholar for cyber policy and security at the Center for International Security and Cooperation and Hank J. Holland Fellow in Cyber Policy and Security at the Hoover Institution, both at Stanford University. His research interests relate broadly to policy-related dimensions of cybersecurity and cyberspace, and he is particularly interested in and knowledgeable about the use of offensive operations in cyberspace, especially as instruments of national policy. In addition to his positions at Stanford University, he is Chief Scientist, Emeritus for the Computer Science and Telecommunications Board, National Research Council (NRC) of the National Academies, where he served from 1990 through 2014 as study director of major projects on public policy and information technology, and Adjunct Senior Research Scholar and Senior Fellow in Cybersecurity (not in residence) at the Saltzman Institute for War and Peace Studies in the School for International and Public Affairs at Columbia University. Prior to his NRC service, he was a professional staff member and staff scientist for the House Armed Services Committee (1986-1990), where his portfolio included defense policy and arms control issues. He received his doctorate in physics from MIT.
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IT vendors are increasingly defining principles to guide the development of artificial intelligence. It’s worth taking a look at what those principles actually say.
It’s worth inserting some technical realities into the debate over whether the United States and its allies should or shouldn’t allow acquisition of Huawei 5G technology for use in communications infrastructure.
Even smart criminals make foolish statements on devices they think may be monitored by law enforcement.
The New York Times reports that the Trump administration has accelerated a secret American program to sabotage Iran’s missiles and rockets by inserting faulty parts and materials into Iran’s aerospace supply chains.
Today the Brookings Institution is publishing our edited volume, "Bytes, Bombs, and Spies: The Strategic Dimensions of Offensive Cyber Operations." And here is
What would it mean if “hacking back” was interpreted as violating the CFAA?