The president can start a trade war without Congress playing any formal role because free trade advocates designed the system that way.
Ganesh Sitaraman is a Professor of Law at Vanderbilt Law School and a Senior Fellow at the Center for American Progress. His new book is The Crisis of the Middle-Class Constitution: Why Economic Inequality Threatens Our Republic.
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As the lower courts take up the new challenges to President Trump’s September 24 proclamation, there is one argument that they should not accept: national security exceptionalism.
Why radical reforms to the regulatory process have serious consequences for national security and the fight against terrorism.
The common denominator of nettlesome war powers questions is who should make the difficult and freighted decisions about whether the nation goes to war, how it fights a war, and when it ends a war. Surprisingly, however, scholars and commentators rarely (if ever) discuss how psychological research on decisionmaking impacts the constitutional design and doctrine around war powers issues. In the last four decades, psychologists have demonstrated systematic biases in individual and group decisionmaking processes.
Is foreign relations law really so different from the law governing domestic affairs? Should it be? We have a new article out this week in the Harvard Law Review that engages these questions in the context of the arc of foreign relations law over the last quarter-century.
Last fall, during the debate on airstrikes in Syria, commentators argued that the United States needed to act in order to preserve the credibility of American threats. If the “red line” that President Obama announced a year earlier wasn’t enforced, the argument went, dictators would be able to act with impunity.