More and more federal courts are confronting the question whether the government’s traditional authority to search persons and property at the border—without a warrant, and typically without any degree of individualized suspicion—extends to travelers’ electronic devices.
Grayson Clary is a second-year student at Harvard Law School. He previously worked at the Woodrow Wilson Center as Special Assistant to former Congresswoman Jane Harman and as a Research Associate for the Center's Digital Futures Project.
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Summary: Fourth Circuit Rejects Suspicionless, Forensic Searches of Devices at the Border in United States v. Kolsuz
When the Supreme Court rejected warrantless cell phone searches incident to arrest in Riley v.
The Democratic National Committee’s lawsuit against the Russian Federation will run aground, as Ingrid Wuerth notes, unless the DNC can find a way around Russia’s immunity in American courts.
One of the stranger dramas in information security may now be over. On Saturday, apparently in protest at President Trump’s missile strike on Syria, the group that calls itself the Shadow Brokers dumped the rest of its cache of stolen NSA hacking tools. The collection of exploits had nominally been up for auction, albeit at an improbably high price in Bitcoin, since last August.
When WikiLeaks shed light on the CIA’s stockpile of software vulnerabilities last week, it revived—but hardly clarified—the debate on whether the government hoards too many bugs. In principle, the interagency Vulnerability Equities Process (VEP) ensures that a flaw is disclosed when the interest in patching it exceeds other governmental interests in exploiting it. Privacy advocates have long suspected that, in practice, the deck is stacked against disclosure.