A new report entitled “Chinese Technology Platforms Operating in the United States” sets forth a framework for understanding the various threats posed by Chinese-owned technology platforms operating in the United States and for assessing the various costs and benefits of proposed responses to these threats.
Gary Corn is the director of the Technology, Law & Security Program and adjunct professor of cyber and national security law at American University Washington College of Law; a senior fellow in national security and cybersecurity at the R Street Institute; a member of the editorial board of the Georgetown Journal of National Security Law and Policy, and the founder and principal of Jus Novus Consulting, LLC. A retired U.S. Army colonel, Corn previously served as the staff judge advocate to U.S. Cyber Command, as a deputy legal counsel to the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the operational law branch chief in the Office of the Judge Advocate General of the Army, the staff judge advocate to United States Army South, on detail as a special assistant United States attorney with the United States Attorney’s Office for the District of Columbia, and on deployment to the former Yugoslav republic of Macedonia as part of the United Nations Preventive Deployment Force and as the chief of International Law for Combined Forces Command, Afghanistan.
Subscribe to this Lawfare contributor via RSS.
Donations to U.S. law enforcement by a Chinese drone manufacturer reignited lingering questions about the risks of Chinese drone technology—and point to a larger clash developing between the U.S. and China.
Russia launched SolarWinds—the latest in a long series of hostile Russian cyber operations—not because the U.S. has engaged too proactively in cyberspace. Quite the opposite; it did so, very simply, because it could.
If information is power, then the corruption of information is the erosion, if not the outright usurpation, of power. This is especially true in the information age, where developments in the technological structure and global interconnectedness of information and telecommunications infrastructure have enabled states to engage in malicious influence campaigns at an unprecedented scope, scale, depth, and speed.
With the arrival of the coronavirus pandemic, Russia’s disinformation campaign has taken a dangerous turn.