Dr. Erica Lonergan (nee Borghard) is an Assistant Professor in the Army Cyber Institute. She is also a Research Scholar in the Saltzman Institute of War and Peace Studies at Columbia University. Prior to that, she held positions as a senior fellow at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace and the Atlantic Council. Previously, Erica served as a Senior Director on the U.S. Cyberspace Solarium Commission. Erica also held an appointment as a Council on Foreign Relations International Affairs Fellow, with placement at JPMorgan Chase and US Cyber Command, and has served as an Assistant Professor and Executive Director of the Rupert H. Johnson Grand Strategy Program in the Department of Social Sciences at West Point. Erica received her PhD in Political Science from Columbia University. She is a term member at the Council on Foreign Relations. The views expressed are personal and do not reflect the policy or position of any U.S. government organization or entity.
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