Recent ransomware attacks against the United States are raising questions about whether and how the military, specifically U.S. Cyber Command, might counter this type of malicious cyber activity. Here, we provide a road map for policymakers to help guide their decision-making on this critical policy challenge.
Dr. Erica Borghard is a Senior Fellow in the Technology and International Affairs Program at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, and a Senior Director on the Cyberspace Solarium Commission. She is a former resident Senior Fellow with the New American Engagement Initiative at the Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security at the Atlantic Council. Previously, she was an Assistant Professor in the Army Cyber Institute at West Point. Prior to that, Erica was a Council on Foreign Relations International Affairs Fellow, spending the 2017-2018 academic year on the Global Cyber Partnerships and Government Strategy team at JPMorgan Chase and at the Cyber National Mission Force at U.S. Cyber Command. From 2014-2017, Erica served as an Assistant Professor and Executive Director of the Rupert H. Johnson Grand Strategy Program in the Department of Social Sciences at West Point. Erica received her Ph.D. in Political Science in 2014 from Columbia University. Erica is a term member of the Council on Foreign Relations, a Research Fellow at the Saltzman Institute of War and Peace Studies at Columbia University. The views expressed are her own.
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