As the UN dismantles the well-rooted legal architecture of free trade, with the broad support of its members, global industry is growing concerned. Recently, members of the UN Human Rights Council (“UNHRC”) discouraged commercial engagements with Israel and voted to establish a publicly-available database of businesses involved in Israeli-controlled territories located beyond the 1949 Armistice Agreement line, also known as the Green Line.
Doron Hindin is currently pursuing an LL.M. at Columbia Law School. Prior to Columbia, Doron worked in the Public International Law and Defense, Aerospace and Homeland Security departments of Herzog Fox and Neeman, Israel’s premier international law firm. Doron’s practice involves advising local and international clients on commercial and regulatory matters related to international trade (export controls, trade sanctions, etc.), anti-bribery compliance and a range of complex public international law matters relevant to the region.
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Concerted efforts to regulate cyber capabilities have borne little fruit, prompting policy makers to look to existing regulatory systems as a basis for action. Established export control systems are often viewed as providing one such mechanism for governing encryption and cyber capabilities. But these frameworks—rooted in post-Cold War arms control systems—may not be suited to the modern proliferation of cyber and encryption software and technologies, which grow more seamless, intangible and borderless by the day.
Recent terrorist attacks and resulting questions about the limits of surveillance have rekindled debate about how governments should deal with the challenges of powerful, commercially available encryption. With active debate in the United States and Western Europe surrounding this issue, it is instructive to note that Israel has been regulating encryption for decades.