President Trump currently has the authority to withdraw the United States from NATO in a manner not subject to judicial review. Congress could change that.
Curtis Bradley is the William Van Alstyne Professor of Law and Professor of Public Policy Studies at Duke University. He joined the Duke law faculty in 2005, after teaching at the University of Virginia and University of Colorado law schools. His courses include International Law, Foreign Relations Law, and Federal Courts. He was the founding co-director of Duke Law School’s Center for International and Comparative Law and is currently a co-Editor-in-Chief of the American Journal of International Law. Recently, he served as a Reporter on the American Law Institute’s Restatement (Fourth) project on The Foreign Relations Law of the United States.
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The United States has thus effectively shifted to an administrative regime for making international agreements, but it has yet to craft an adequate system of oversight and accountability to go along with that regime.
Until recently, Article II treaties have played a meaningful role in U.S. foreign relations law and policy. That no longer seems to be the case.
This Office of Legal Counsel test for unilateral uses of force provides no meaningful constraint on presidential power.
A forthcoming draft paper in the Harvard Law Review takes up the question.
In light of President Trump's repeated disparagement of the judiciary and unfounded criticism of the news media for under-reporting terrorist attacks, it is important to start thinking now about how to defend these institutions' future checking power.
Affirming a lower court decision, the UK Supreme Court has held that, despite the referendum in June 2016 calling for withdrawal from the European Union, Britain cannot withdraw from the Union without parliamentary approval.