The Department of Justice wants access to encrypted consumer devices but promises not to infiltrate business products or affect critical infrastructure. Yet that's not possible, because there is no longer any difference between those categories of devices.
Bruce Schneier is a security technologist. He is the author of 14 books—including "Click Here to Kill Everybody: Security and Survival in a Hyper-connected World"—as well as hundreds of articles, essays, and academic papers. His newsletter “Crypto-Gram” and blog “Schneier on Security” are read by over 250,000 people. Schneier is a fellow and lecturer at Harvard Kennedy School a fellow at the Berkman-Klein Center for Internet and Society, a board member of the Electronic Frontier Foundation and Access Now, and a Special Advisor to IBM Security.
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In a speech on Tuesday, Barr outlined a major change in the U.S. government’s position on encryption: adding lawful access to a system reduces its security.
Fake news is a real and dangerous internet trend—but the phenomenon has effects in other areas of life as well. In addition to fake news, I worry about fake research.
Information attacks, whether they’re attempts to polarize political processes or to increase mistrust in social institutions, involve a series of steps. And enumerating those steps will clarify possibilities for defense.
The Levy-Robinson proposal is no less dangerous a backdoor than any others that have been proposed.
A new paper explains why disinformation campaigns that act as a stabilizing influence in Russia are destabilizing in the United States.