It’s now public—as required by the 2012 Intelligence Authorization Act.
Here’s the chart:
Here’s how the DNI’s office assesses the two key questions Congress required it to address:
Sec. 307 (a) (2) An assessment of the likelihood that such detainees will engage in terrorism.
Based on trends identified during the past ten years, we assess that if additional detainees are transferred without conditions from GTMO, some will reengage in terrorist or insurgent activities. Transfers to countries with ongoing conflicts and internal instability as well as active recruitment by insurgent and terrorist organizations pose a particular problem.
Sec. 307 (a) (2) (cont.) An assessment of the likelihood that such detainees will communicate with persons in terrorist organizations.
Former GTMO detainees routinely communicate with each other, families of other former detainees, and previous associates who are members of terrorist organizations. The reasons for communication span from the mundane (reminiscing about shared experiences) to the nefarious (planning terrorist operations). We assess that some GTMO detainees transferred in the future also will communicate with other former GTMO detainees and persons in terrorist organizations. We do not consider mere communication with individuals or organizations—including other former GTMO detainees—an indicator of reengagement. Rather, the motives, intentions, and purposes of each communication are taken into account when assessing whether the individual has reengaged.
The last such report was back in March.